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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Thomas A. Daily
Re c e n t  De v e l o pm e n t s  in  Na t u r a l  Re s o u r c e s  La w  Ci r c a  2000-01
By Thomas A. Daily1
Arkansas Supreme Court Affirms Hales v. SEECO 
as Contortionists’ Dream Comes True
This author’s vocabulary was recently expanded to include “contort,” a noun. He first 
heard the term from Ed Norwood, a sage South Texas trial lawyer and co-presenter to this 
institute. Contort should never be confused with the verb, also spelled “contort,” which, 
according to Webster, means “to twist into or as if into a strained shape or expression.”2 
Webster also advises that the verb “contort” comes to us from the same root as the word 
“torture” and that it is a synonym of “deform.” The noun “contort,” on the other hand, means a 
claim for breach of contract which a clever plaintiffs lawyer (the “contortionist”) and a gullible 
court have morphed into a tort case.
Whenever one learns a new word it is advisable to try it out in a couple of sentences. 
How about: “Hales court allows contortionists to contort a simple ‘implied covenant to market’ 
case into a nightmare contort?” That’s once. We will try again a little later.
Once upon a time there was a natural gas utility in Northwest Arkansas called “Arkansas 
Western Gas Company.” Arkansas Western, like other gas utilities o f its time, not only sold gas 
to end user, but also produced the gas and transported it to the retail distribution system. In 
1978, responding to an order of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, Arkansas Western 
reorganized into a holding company and changed its name to Southwestern Energy Company.
The gas production business and leasehold interests were transferred to a new subsidiary,
SEECO, Inc., and the public utility business was transferred to the re-named Arkansas Western 
Gas Company. As a part of this Public Service Commission mandated reorganization, SEECO 
and AWG entered into a 20-year contract for the sale of gas produced from leases held by
1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Attorneys, Fort Smith, Arkansas.
2Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, online edition.
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SEECO, known as Contract 59. Pursuant to Contract 59, SEECO dedicated substantial gas 
reserves in Franklin, Johnson, Washington, Logan and Crawford Counties to AWG. In return, 
AWG promised to pay the “market-value” price for gas throughout the contract’s 20-year term. 
However “market-value” was determined not by the external market but by a constantly 
escalating formula. The contract also contained a take-or-pay obligation, which provided that 
AWG would buy a certain volume of gas at the contract price or pay a specified price without 
taking the gas.
Meanwhile, the external market price for natural gas did not rise as the parties had 
expected. According to its testimony, SEECO was concerned that if it forced Contract 59 to be 
strictly enforced the Public Service Commission would disallow the inclusion of the full price in 
Arkansas Western’s rate base. If that had happened, Arkansas Western had the right to terminate 
Contract 59 altogether under the contract’s “regulatory out” clause. So, on December 10, 1984, 
Arkansas Western froze the price of gas purchased from SEECO at $3.85 per MCF.3
On January 16, 1990, AWG filed an application with the Public Service Commission for 
approval of a general change in its rates and tariffs. On December 21, 1990, the Public Service 
Commission approved the overall revenue requirement and associated tariffs. However, it 
expressed concern over AWG's gas purchasing practices, its affiliate transactions with SEECO, its 
allocation of gas costs, and its transportation practices. The Public Service Commission initiated 
proceedings to address these issues, and following those proceedings, it issued its Order No. 41 
on November 29, 1993, in which it addressed the propriety of Arkansas Western's contracting 
practices with SEECO. The Agency specifically noted that it must decide whether the market 
prices set in Contract 59 were reasonable so to allow them to be passed on to AWG's ratepayers. 
Order No. 41 found that the relationship between SEECO and AWG was "fraught with conflicts 
of interest." It further found that AWG was not in compliance with Ark. Code Ann.§ 23-15-103 
(1987), the least cost purchasing statute. The Public Service Commission ordered that for 
purposes of the cost of gas charged to its Arkansas ratepayers, Arkansas Western's purchases 
from SEECO under Contract 59 must henceforth be indexed to an appropriate market price based
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3A price that just about every other gas producer in the Arkoma Basin would have traded 
the farm for.
upon published prices. On October 31, 1994, AWG, SEECO, the Public Service Commission, the 
Arkansas Attorney General, and a group of Northwest Arkansas Gas Consumers entered into a 
Stipulation and Agreement whereby Contract 59 was amended to reflect the APSC's findings in 
Order No. 41. The APSC published this stipulation in its Order No. 52 on January 5, 1995. As 
part of the Stipulation and Agreement, SEECO agreed to waive all take-or-pay pricing, buy-down 
demands, and other contractual claims arising under Contract 59 prior to July 1, 1994.
It sounds like Arkansas Western and SEECO were right to have concluded in 
1984 that the Public Service Commission would never have allowed strict enforcement of 
Contract 59. If the agency would not permit these affiliated companies to buy/sell gas at $3.83 
per MCF, why on earth would it have permitted the much higher price prescribed by Contract 59? 
Indeed, the “conflict of interest” criticized by the Public Service Commission resulted in a gas 
price which that agency found was too high. One contort later, the Supreme Court would believe 
that the companies’ conflict of interest led them to conspire to lower the price to the detriment of 
SEECO’s royalty owners.
On May 24, 1996, Allen Hales and the other named appellees filed suit on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly situated royalty owners under SEECO gas leases. In their 
complaint, the class alleged that throughout the term of Contract 59, SEECO never requested nor 
required Arkansas Western to pay the market price or take the volumes of gas set out under the 
express terms of the contract. The complaint also referred to the fact that in 1984, Arkansas 
Western froze the price of gas to be paid SEECO for gas produced and sold under Contract 59. 
The class asserted that this freeze violated the pricing provisions of Contract 59, and contended 
that SEECO did nothing to contest the price freeze implemented by Arkansas Western. Because 
the price freeze was not to SEECO's advantage, the class asserted that the freeze was only 
implemented to benefit Arkansas Western and significantly reduced the amount of royalty 
payments the class would receive under Contract 59.
Now for the contort. The class further alleged fraud and constructive fraud. Their 
complaint contended that in a 1983 letter, SEECO advised certain royalty owners that it had 
entered into a gas-sales contract with Natural Gas Pipeline (NGP) which would result in reduced 
royalties. The royalty owners claimed that SEECO failed to disclose that the same gas dedicated
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under the NGP contract was already dedicated under Contract 59, with its take-or-pay provision, 
at a significantly higher purchase price. The complaint further asserted that in 1987, SEECO 
solicited the purchase of mineral interests from certain royalty owners and misrepresented the 
market price for natural gas. In the solicitation letter, SEECO noted that gas prices had been 
declining in recent years, but, according to the complaint, SEECO failed to disclose that under 
Contract 59, Arkansas Western was obligated to make minimum volume purchases of gas and to 
pay for that gas at a certain price as part of the arrangement for having the gas reserves dedicated 
for its use for twenty years. The class further claimed that SEECO fraudulently concealed its 
failures under Contract 59 by intentionally refusing to document the pricing and other deficiencies 
under the contract and by failing to reveal Contract 59 pricing on check stubs and in the monthly 
royalty statements.4
The Hales litigation was as mean spirited as Arkansas has ever seen. SEECO took three 
unsuccessful interlocutory appeals. The jury bought the contort hook, line and sinker, awarding 
$62,136,827 to which the trial court added interest raising the total to $93,222,157. Ultimately, 
post judgment interest took the judgment over $100,000,000, clearly a state record. That’s where 
we were when we reported Hales to the 2000 Natural Resources Law Institute. This author 
boldly predicted a reversal. Sadly, he was wrong.
In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales5 the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. In its lengthy opinion 
the court rejected each of the defendants’ many arguments. That opinion makes much of the 
court’s deference to the jury’s determination of matters of fact. Much of it is devoted to 
discussions of matters of general law and of trial and appellate procedure. However, the court
4Like many companies, SEECO’s software’s limitations left it with no place to catagorize 
these NGP sales for check stub purposes, but contained a category for oil sales. Since the 
Arkoma Basin produces absolutely no oil, SEECO used this category to tabulate the sales to 
NGP, so they appeared on the check stub as oil sales. In a particularly glaring display of 
ignorance of royalty accounting practices (aided, no doubt by SEECO’s failure to refute the 
accusation) the Supreme Court allowed this completely innocent practice to be contorted into 
fraud.
5341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).
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appears to have spoken to at least four mineral law issues and you won’t like what it said.
First, the court approved a jury instruction that, for purposes of the class’ lease royalty 
clauses, “market price” was the formula-driven Contract 59 price. Thus, apparently, SEECO was 
required to either compel enforcement of the contract price or, if not, to strictly adhere to the 
contract’s price renegotiation provisions. The court based this holding upon Hillard v. Stephens6 
which held that a producer that had, in good faith, signed a long term fixed-price contract was not 
required to pay royalty based upon the external market price prevailing many years later. The 
Hales court applied Hillard in reverse. It held, in effect, that once a producer secures a price or 
pricing formula it may not renegotiate the price downward, notwithstanding that it might be 
prudent to do so. That is simply wrong. There are valid reasons for a prudent operator to agree, 
in good faith, to a price reduction. Indeed, that might well be in the best long range interest of 
royalty owners. The implied covenant to market gas on favorable terms imposes a standard of 
prudence and good faith upon any such price change and thus protects royalty owners from 
collusion between a producer and purchaser. There is no valid reason to hold that such a price 
reduction is an express breach of the royalty clause or, worse still, a contort.
Second, the court held that whether an oil and gas lessee occupies a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship with its lessor is a question of fact which the jury is free to decide on a case 
by case basis. This is important. If a lessee is a fiduciary, it has an affirmative duty to disclose 
matters which might constitute causes of action against it or else be judged guilty of fraud and/or 
fraudulent concealment, which tolls the running of limitations. Here is exactly what the Hales 
court said:
We have held that whether a confidential relationship exists is a question of fact for 
the trier of fact to decide. Donaldson v. Johnson, 235 Ark. 348, 359 S.W.2d 810 
(1962); see also Marsh v. Nat'l Bank o f Commerce, 37 Ark. App. 41, 822 
S.W.2d 404 (1992). Because the jury returned verdicts for fraud, constructive 
fraud, and fraudulent concealment, we presume that it found that a confidential or 
special relationship did exist giving rise to a duty on the part of SEECO to speak 
and clarify misinformation upon which others might rely. Berkeley Pump Co. v. 
Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983). Other jurisdictions
6276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1992).
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have affirmed that a producer occupies a fiduciary relationship with respect to its 
royalty owners. See, e.g., Roberts Ranch Co. v. Exxon Corp., 43 F. Supp.2d 1252 
(W.D. Okla. 1997). Charles Scharlau testified that he agreed in 1991 that SEECO 
owed a fiduciary duty to its royalty owners and added that SEECO had always 
tried to act as a fiduciary towards them. That supports the jury's verdict. We 
affirm on this issue.7
You read it right. The court presumed that the jury had found that there was a 
confidential relationship. Why must such an important finding be presumed? Were there no 
express jury instructions on this critical issue?
Neither Donaldson v. Johnson nor Marsh v. Nat’l Bank o f Commerce, cited by the court 
begin to suggest that a confidential relationship can be presumed or even that such a relationship 
is easily proven. Both affirmed appeals from decisions of chancellors, not juries, which refused to 
find confidential relationships. Indeed, both of those cases suggest that the burden of proving a 
confidential relationship is upon the party alleging the relationship and that it is a heavy burden 
indeed. It is hard to believe that even a contortionist can meet that burden with one answer of one 
witness given in one discovery deposition.
In Klein v. Arkoma Production Co.8 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under 
Arkansas law a lessee is not a fiduciary, citing Amoco Production Co. v. Ware.9 While the Amoco 
decision does not expressly reject the fiduciary theory, its tenor is certainly to that effect. We 
have not heard the end of this issue. Unless the Arkansas Court limits this ruling to the Hales 
facts,10 it will have removed the defense of limitations from royalty owner litigation in Arkansas.
In another highly questionable holding the court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of 
evidence that other producers, not affiliated with Arkansas Western, made similar price 
concessions to the utility during the same time-frame:
1 SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, Supra, 341 Ark. at 698 (emphasis added)
873 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996).
9269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 620 (1980).
10Sometimes the Arkansas Court “limits” a ruling by simply ignoring it in subsequent 
opinions.
- 6-
The appellants claim that evidence showing that AWG received concessions from 
unaffiliated producers with regard to "market-outs," well releases, price freezes, 
and reduced take-or-pay obligations from the 1980's through 1992 was relevant 
and essential to SEECO's defense that it acted prudently in agreeing to the same or 
similar concessions in the instant case. The appellants maintain that the trial judge 
abused his discretion by disallowing this evidence as irrelevant. We disagree.
On August 24, 1998, the royalty owners filed a motion in limine asking the trial 
judge to preclude the appellants from referring to or offering at trial evidence 
showing that unaffiliated gas producers accepted a price freeze or made other 
contract concessions that were comparable to or more onerous than those SEECO 
accepted. The trial judge granted the motion based on Charles Scharlau's 
deposition testimony that AWG had no contract for gas "comparable" to Contract 
59. This court has held that the relevance of evidence is within the trial court's 
sound discretion, subject to reversal only if an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.
Arthur v. Zearley, 337 Ark. 125, 992 S.W.2d 67 (1999); Potlatch Corp. v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 321 Ark. 314, 902 S.W.2d 217 (1995). The appellants 
cite us to Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1986), and 
emphasize that in Parker, the trial court affirmed the prudency of a gas producer's 
contract with an affiliated buyer based in part on the fact that other unaffiliated 
sellers were accepting terms similar to those that the affiliated buyer offered. But 
the Parker decision does not address a challenge to the comparability of the 
evidence of other concessions. Thus, it is not instructive on this point.11
SEECO and Arkansas Western were accused of abusing their affiliate relationship to reach 
a pricing scheme which violated the royalty owners. What more probative evidence could there 
be than the fact that other producers gave Arkansas Western similar concessions. Again, the 
contortionists managed to carry the day with a single line from a single deposition. That 
deposition testimony certainly is admissible to impeach evidence of other producers’ price 
concessions, but it should never foreclose that evidence altogether. Hales is a decision where, for 
the most part, the court deferentially refuses to invade the province of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the facts. However, on this most critical issue it employed a double 
standard allowing the trial judge to deny the jury the opportunity to hear the most important 
exonerating evidence in the whole case.
Finally, the court held that under Arkansas law royalty owners have a right to a portion of
11 SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, Supra, 341 Ark. at 709.
- 7-
a lessee’s take-or-pay claims. The court thus adopted the ruling to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Klein v. Arkoma Production C o n and Klein v. Jones’3 that a lessor is entitled to share 
in all benefits received by the lessee. The court in Hales acknowledged that Arkansas is among a 
minority of two states on this issue, but held that such result is compelled by an Arkansas 
statute.14
How could this have happened? Have the contortionists poisoned the water in Little Rock 
with hallucinogens? Unlikely. A number of factors probably contributed. Here are some, in no 
particular order of importance.
• By the time Hales reached the Supreme Court on its merits SEECO had already lost three 
interlocutory appeals. The Court had clearly lost its patience with SEECO. The court’s 
opinion begins:
This is the fourth appeal to come before us in this case. In SEECO,
Inc. v. Hales, 330 Ark. 402, 954 S.W.2d 234 (1997) (SEECO I), 
we affirmed the certification of a class of royalty owners in 
litigation brought against appellants SEECO, AWG, and SWN. In 
SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 134, 969 S.W.2d 193 (1998)
(SEECO, II), we affirmed the trial judge’s disqualification of 
co-counsel for SEECO, AWG, and SWN from participating in this 
case because he had announced his candidacy for the same judicial 
position held by the trial judge. In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark.
307, 973 S.W.2d 818 (1998) (SEECO III), we affirmed the trial 
judge's notice order to a subclass of royalty owners, which had the 
effect of permitting the trial to proceed as scheduled.15
• This was ugly litigation for which the court blamed SEECO alone. Sports officials are 
often accused of punishing the reaction rather than the action which caused it. That 
certainly happened in Hales. SEECO’s counsel was caught making what the court 
considered to be a deliberate misstatement of fact in his closing argument.
n Supra.
13980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
14Ark. Code. Ann. §15-74-705 (Repl. 1994).
15SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, Supra, 341 Ark. at 679.
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• SEECO put too many of its eggs into one unsuccessful defense. SEECO’s most fervent 
argument in its brief and at oral argument was that it was immune from this suit altogether 
because the Public Service Commission’s holding that Contract 59's modified price was 
too high was res judicata as to the class’ claims. The problem, of course, was that the 
royalty owners were not parties to the Public Service Commission’s proceedings.
• SEECO caused its Public Service Commission testimony to be placed under seal thus 
giving the impression that it had something to hide.
• A SEECO employee destroyed files during discovery which contained discovered 
documents. SEECO argued that all these documents were mere copies and that it had 
produced the same documents in other files but damage was clearly done.
• Complicated oil and gas cases are, in many cases, beyond the ability of a busy court to 
comprehend.
• These contortionists were really good at contorting and they suckered the court into 
standing back while a really bad contort took place.
That’s the second sentence, I have learned the word. It is time to move on.
Ok l a h o m a  De c i s i o n s  Cl a r i f y  JOA Is s u e s  
The last few years have seen several large transactions, each involving sales of 
hundreds of producing properties from one producer to another. These transactions have 
spawned some interesting questions about the interpretation of various JOA provisions. Two 
recent cases arising out of Oklahoma may provide some guidance. In Brown v. Samson 
Resources Company16 the issue was whether Samson, which held preferential rights to purchase 
under an operating agreement, had the right to purchase some unit wells without purchasing all 
unit wells. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma agreed with 
Samson that it could exercise its rights piecemeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 
This opinion, which was not designated for publication, may be downloaded by selecting the 
Supreme Court Network (Online Search) at http://www.state.ok.us/osfdocs/judhp.html.
The court noted that the identical issue is the subject of a pending appeal within the
16No. 99-6344 (10th Cir. 09/01/2000) (table - opinion not for publication)
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Oklahoma state court system. In that case17 the lower court has ruled in favor o f Samson that it 
may select which properties to purchase without purchasing them all.
In Duncan Oil Properties, Inc. v. Vastar Resources, Inc.18 Vastar purchased all o f  the 
interest of Union Oil Company o f California in a drilling unit. Since Unocal was the former unit 
operator, an operator’s election was triggered by Vastar’s purchase. The issue was whether 
Vastar, as Unocal’s successor, was entitled to vote in that election. If Vastar could vote it would 
become successor operator. If not, Duncan would become operator. The trial court held for 
Duncan but the Oklahoma Court o f Appeals reversed holding that when Vastar purchased 
Unocal’s interest it became a party to the Operating Agreement and was entitled to vote to elect 
itself operator.
Oklaho ma  Cour t  of  Appea ls  l im it s  a ppl ic a t io n  
o f  D u h i g  Ru l e  to  wa rr an ty  d ee d s .
The Duhig Rule was first expressed by the Texas Supreme Court in the case o f  Duhig v. 
Peavey-Moore Lumber Co.19 It is a rule that resolves the dilemma caused by a grantor’s apparent 
attempted mineral reservation made in the face o f prior mineral reservations. It may be 
summarized as follows:
Absent express language to the contrary, any prior mineral severance will be 
subtracted from an attempted mineral reservation in the current deed so as to give 
full effect, if  possible, to the interest granted rather than to the interest reserved.
In other words, where full effect cannot be given both to the granted interest and 
to a reserved interest, the court will give priority to the granted interest (rather 
than to the reserved interest) until the granted interest is fully satisfied.
The Duhig Rule was adopted in Arkansas by Peterson v. Simpson20 and by Oklahoma in
17Samson Resources Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. CJ-96-38 (Okla. D. Ellis County 
Aug. 31, 1999)
182000 OK CIV APP 146 (Okla.App. 08/21/2000)
19135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
20 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985).
- 10-
Birmingham v. McCoy21 and Bryan v. Everettr2 Early on, though, it was apparently unclear 
whether the Duhig Rule was based upon the principle o f estoppel by deed (in which case it would 
only apply to warranty deeds) or some other principle or principles o f  interpretation. In Hill v. 
Gilliam23 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Arkansas Duhig Rule applied only to 
warranty deeds. Recently, the Oklahoma Court o f Appeals reached the same result in Young v. 
Vermillion.24
Ark a n sa s  Oil  a n d  Ga s  Comm is si on  Inc re as es  
Produ ct ion  Allowa bl es , Rai se s  Fees
On July 25, 2000 the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission unanimously approved a change 
to its Rule D-16. That change increases the production allowable for a gas well from 50% to 
75% o f the w ell’s calculated absolute open flow and increases the minimum production allowable 
from 274 to 500 m cf per day, regardless o f the w ell’s absolute open flow. This rule change also 
deletes the requirement that periodic open flow tests o f minimum allowable wells be witnessed by 
Commission staff members. As under the former rule, a w ell’s production allowable is penalized 
arithmetically if  the w ell’s location encroaches upon its drilling unit’s boundary (a location closer 
than 1,300 feet to a boundary is generally considered encroaching). Likewise, a w ell’s production 
allowable is adjusted arithmetically if  its drilling unit size is different from the standard unit size 
for the gas field within which the unit is located.
The Arkansas Commission also raised the fees which it charges to process various 
applications which it processes for producers. These fees were generally doubled, with the price 
for filing an application to be heard on the Commission’s docket increasing from $250 to $500.
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21 1960 Ok. 183, 358 P.2d 824 (1961).
22 1961 Ok. 209, 365 P.2d 146 (1961).
23 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
24 1999 Ok. Civ. App. 114, 992 P.2d 917 (1999).
Ar k a n s a s  Le g isl atu re  Con venes ; t h e  Mis c h ie f  Begins
Each biennium, in odd numbered years, a vague feeling o f uneasiness spreads throughout 
the land. The cause is apparent. The Arkansas General Assembly has ridden into Little Rock to 
kick some butt. Often that butt belongs to some industry which has gored the poor ox o f some 
legislative crony. In the old days, before term limits, you at least knew who your friends and 
enemies in the legislature were. Those folks are mostly gone now and the new bunch is pretty 
scary.
This is a story in progress; it will be updated. As o f the publication date o f this paper the 
following bills o f interest to the natural resources industries have been filed:
Senate Bill 15 would have terrorized all regulated industries in Arkansas by creating a de 
novo appeal from all final orders of administrative agencies. It was opposed by virtually everyone 
in state government and was withdrawn by its sponsor, Senator Cliff Hoofman. It read:
State of Arkansas
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
By: Senator Hoofman
A Bill
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE 25-15-212 TO PROVIDE FOR 
JUDICIAL HEARINGS DE NOVO FROM ALL FINAL AGENCY 
ADJUDICATIONS; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Subtitle
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE 25-15-212 
TO PROVIDE FOR JUDICIAL HEARINGS DE NOVO 
FROM ALL FINAL AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code 25-15-212 is amended to read as follows:
25-15-212. Administrative adjudication - Judicial review.
(a) In cases of final agency adjudications, any person, except an inmate under sentence to the custody of 
the Department of Correction, who considers himself injured in his person, business, or property by final agency 
action shall be entitled to a judicial review of  the-action under  this subchapter hearing de novo. Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to limit other means of review provided by law.
(b) (1) Proceedings for review a judicial hearing shall be instituted by filing a petition within thirty (30) 
days after service upon petitioner of the agency's final decision in:
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SENATE BILL 15
(A) The circuit court of any county in which the petitioner resides or does business; or
(B) The Circuit Court of Pulaski County.
(2) Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all other parties of record in 
accordance with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) In its discretion, the court may permit other interested persons to intervene.
(c) The filing of the petition does not shall automatically stay enforcement of the agency decision, but the 
agency or reviewing court may do so upon such terms as may be just. However, on review of  prior to hearings 
regarding disciplinary orders issued by professional licensing boards governing professions of the healing arts, the 
reviewing court, only after notice and hearing, may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the 
effective date of  an orders enforcing the agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of review 
the judicial proceedings.
(d)( 1 ) Within thirty (30) days after service of the petition or within such fur ther time as the court may 
allow but not exceeding an aggregate of  ninety (90)"days,-the agency shall transmit to the reviewing court the 
original o r  a certified copy of the entire record of  the proceeding “under review.
(2) The cost of the preparation of the record shall be borne by the-agency. However, the cost of 
the record shall be recovered from the appealing party if the agency is the prevailing party.
(3) By stipulation of  all parties to the review proceeding, the record may be  shortened. Any party 
unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may bc taxed by the court for the additional costs.
(4) The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.
(e) If review proceedings have been instituted in two (2) or more circuit courts with respect to the same 
order, the agency concerned shall file the record in the court in which a proceeding was first instituted. The other 
courts in which the proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court in which the record has 
been filed.
(f) If before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional 
evidence and the court finds that the  evidenee is-material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it 
in the proceeding before the agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency 
upon any conditions which may be just. The agency may modify its findings and decision by reason of the 
additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the 
reviewing court.
(f)(d) The review hearing shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall bc confined to the 
record, except that in cases of  alleged irregularities  in procedure before the agency not shown in the record, 
testimony may be taken before the court. The court shall, upon request, hear oral argument and receive written 
briefs.
( h )(e) The court may affirm the decision of the agency o r remand the case for further proceedings. It may 
reverse or m odify   the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because  the 
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of  constitutional or statutory provisions, 
(2) In excess of the agency's statutory authority;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;  
(4) Affected by other error or l a w
(5) Not supported by substantial evidence of record; or-
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. The court is authorized to 
enter findings and orders consistent with the evidence presented and within the statutory authority of the agency 
from which the appeal was taken.
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As Engrossed: H1/25/01
A Bill
State of Arkansas 
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
By: Representative Milum
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE ANNOTATED 18-61-101 TO 
PROVIDE THAT EASEMENTS MAY ONLY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH 
AN EXPRESS WRITTEN GRANT OF EASEMENT; AND FOR OTHER 
PURPOSES.
Subtitle
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE ANNOTATED 
18-61-101 TO PROVIDE THAT EASEMENTS MAY 
ONLY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH AN EXPRESS 
WRITTEN GRANT OF EASEMENT.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code 18-61-101 is amended to read as follows:
18-61-101. Actions to recover land, tenements, or hereditaments.
(a) No person or his heirs shall have, sue, or maintain any action or suit, either in law or equity, for any 
lands, tenements, or hereditaments after seven (7) years once his right to commence, have, or maintain the suit 
shall have come, fallen, or accrued. All suits, either in law or equity, for the recovery of any lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments shall be had and sued within seven (7) years next after the title or cause of action accrued and no 
time after the seven (7) years shall have passed.
(b) If any person who is, or shall be, entitled to commence and prosecute a suit or action in law or equity 
is, or shall be, at the time the right or title first accrued come or fallen within the age of twenty-one (21) years or 
non compos mentis, the person or his heirs, shall and may, notwithstanding the seven (7) years may have expired, 
bring his suit or action if the infant or non compos mentis, or his heirs, shall bring it within three (3) years next 
after full age or coming of sound mind.
(c) No cumulative disability shall prevent the bar formed and constituted by the saving of this section.
(d) Subsections (a). (b)  and (c) of this This section shall not apply to lands which have been sold to any 
improvement district of any kind or character for taxes due the districts, nor to any taxes due any improvement 
districts, but the lien of these taxes shall continue until paid.
(e) An easement shall not be acquired, created, nor granted by any court, based on prescription, or 
adverse use, with or without the knowledge of the person against whom the easement is claimed, but shall only be 
acquired and created through an express written grant of easement executed by the owners of the real property or 
the owners’ attorney in fact.
(f) The provisions o f  subsection (e) shall not apply to public utilities, telecommunication companies.
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House Bill 1051, by Representative Milum, seeks to eliminate the creation of prescriptive 
easements. The bill, as filed, was a lot worse than it now is, as amended. Nevertheless, it will still 
pose problems if  enacted. It reads:
HOUSE BILL 1051
pipeline companies, companies engaged in oil, gas or brine exploration or production operations, natural gas 
storage companies, counties, municipalities, or the State o f Arkansas, and shall not prohibit the exercise o f  the 
right o f  eminent domain by any entity possessing that right.
(g) A public utility, telecommunication company, pipeline company, company engaged in oil, gas or 
brine exploration or production operations, natural gas storage company, county, municipality  or the State o f  
Arkansas, shall have the right o f  access, ingress and egress to rebuild, upgrade, modernize, reconstruct, protect, 
repair, bury or maintain its facilities located on property subject to a prescriptive easement in its favor.
(h) The provisions o f  subsection (e) are intended to be prospective only and shall not apply to any 
prescriptive easements which may have been previously created or granted by an order or judgement o f  a court o f 
competent jurisdiction.
/s/ Milum
Senate Bill 251, sponsored by Senator Everett, would increase the severance tax on 
natural gas from the current de minimus .3¢ per MFC to 5% of well-head price. At $4.50 per MFC 
gas, that is about a 7,000% increase. No one likes to be taxed. Certainly the gas industry does 
not relish the state’s budget being balanced across its back. However, what more attractive target 
could there be? This is an industry which survived gas prices of less than $2 per MFC. Why then, 
with gas prices over $5, should it not be able to pay more taxes? There are good arguments to 
the contrary, but they may not be persuasive. It may be necessary to compromise. Here is the 
bill:
State o f  Arkansas 
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
By: Senator Everett
A Bill
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT TO INCREASE THE SEVERANCE TAX ON NATURAL GAS;
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Subtitle
TO INCREASE THE SEVERANCE TAX ON NATURAL 
GAS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code 26-58-111(5), concerning the severance tax on natural gas, is amended to 
read as follows:
(5) On natural gas, three-tenths of one cent (3/10 of 1 ) per one thousand cubic feet (1,000 cu. ft.) five
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SENATE BILL 251
percent (5%) of the wellhead price;
House Bill 1534 is a sweeping effort to reduce the terms of members of state 
administrative agencies and, in many instances, to term-limit them as well. It proposes to reduce 
the length of terms for Oil and Gas Commissioners from six years to four years and to limit the 
Commissioners to two such four-year terms. There seems to be a general consensus among 
intelligent life in Arkansas that term limits are a miserable failure. Indeed, the legislative hopper is 
filled with proposed Constitutional Amendments designed to repeal this failed experiment. Why, 
then, do we have this proposal to term-limit members of administrative agencies?
We are told that this is the Governor’s idea. If so, it ranks among his worst. The 
Governor appoints Commissioners. If the Governor wants to limit a Commissioner’s term, the 
Governor may simply not reappoint that Commissioner. He doesn’t need a law to do that.
On the other hand, many administrative agencies, including the Oil and Gas Commission, 
benefit from continuity of policy which is largely the result of the fact that a few very able 
Commissioners have been on the job for a long time. If this bill passes, that will no longer be an 
option. Here’s what it says:
State of Arkansas 
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
A Bill
By: Representatives M. Smith, Shoffner, Glover, King By: Senator Hill
HOUSE BILL 1534
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT CONCERNING THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF PERSONS 
APPOINTED TO VARIOUS BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, COMMITTEES, 
COUNCILS, AND PANELS; TO LIMIT LENGTH OF SERVICE TO SERVE 
ON SUCH BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, COMMITTEES, COUNCILS, AND 
PANELS; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Subtitle
AN ACT CONCERNING THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF 
PERSONS APPOINTED TO VARIOUS BOARDS,
COMMISSIONS, COMMITTEES, COUNCILS, AND 
PANELS; AND TO LIMIT LENGTH OF SERVICE 
TO SERVE ON SUCH BOARDS, COMMISSIONS,
COMMITTEES, COUNCILS, AND PANELS.
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State of Arkansas 
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
By: Senator Mahony
A Bill
SENATE BILL 429
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT TO AMEND VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Subtitle
TO AMEND VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code 25-15-202(4), regarding definitions in the Administrative Procedure Act, is 
amended to read as follows:
(4)(A) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability and future effect that implements, 
interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice of any agency and 
includes, but is not limited to the amendment or repeal of a prior rule.
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BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Construction.
(a) This act shall not be construed to change the term of office of a person appointed to a board, 
commission, committee, council, or panel before July 1, 2001.
(b) The limitation imposed by this act on the number of terms for which a person may be appointed to a 
board, commission, committee, council, or panel shall not apply to any term for which the person was appointed 
before July 1, 2001.
SECTION 150. Arkansas Code 15-71-102(a), concerning the Oil and Gas Commission, is amended to 
read as follows:
(a)(1) The commission shall consist of nine (9) members, each to be appointed for a term of six (6) four 
(4) years, and, in event of a vacancy, the Governor shall by appointment fill the unexpired term.
(2) No member of the commission shall be appointed to serve more than two (2) consecutive full
terms.
(3) The appointing authority shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, adjust the 
length of terms to insure that the terms of commission members are staggered so that, insofar as is possible, an 
equal number of members shall rotate each year.
Senator Jody Mahony has long been a champion of administrative reform in Arkansas. 
Senate Bill 429 is his latest effort in that regard. It appears to be pretty benign:
(B) "Rule" does not mean:
(i) Statements concerning the internal management of an agency and which do not 
affect the private rights or procedures available to the public:
(ii) Declaratory rulings issued pursuant to § 25-15-206: or
(iii) Intra-agency memoranda:
SECTION 2. Arkansas Code 25-15-203(b) is amended to read as follows:
(b) No agency rule, order, or decision shall be valid or effective against any person or party, nor may it be 
invoked by the agency for any purpose, until it has been filed and made available for public inspection as required 
in this subchapter. This provision shall not apply in favor of any person or party with actual knowledge of an 
agency rule, order, or decision.
SECTION 3. Arkansas Code 25-15-204 is amended to read as follows:
25-15-204. Rules - Procedure for adoption.
(a) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency shall:
(1) Give at least thirty (30) days' notice of its intended action. The thirty-day period shall begin 
on the first day of the publication of notice.
(A) The notice shall include a statement of the terms or substance of the intended 
action, or a description of the subjects and issues involved, and the time, the place where, and the manner in which 
interested persons may present their views thereon.
(B) The notice shall be mailed to any person specified by law and to all persons who 
shall have requested advance notice of rulemaking proceedings.
(C) The Unless otherwise provided by law, the notice shall be published as specified by 
law or, if no manner of publication is so specified, then in those in a newspaper newspapers of general daily 
circulation for seven (7) consecutive days and, where appropriate, in those trade, industry, or professional 
publications which the agency may select;
(2) (A) Afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit written data, views, or 
arguments, orally or in writing.
(B) Opportunity for oral hearing must be granted if requested by twenty-five (25) 
persons, by a governmental subdivision or agency, or by an association having no fewer than twenty-five (25) 
members.
(C) The agency shall fully consider all written and oral submissions respecting the 
proposed rule before finalizing the language of the proposed rule and filing the proposed rule as required by 
subsection (d) of this section.
(D) Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested to do so by an interested person 
either prior to adoption or within thirty (30) days thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons 
for and against its adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against its 
adoption.
(E) Where rules are required by law to be made on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing, the provisions of that law shall apply in place of this subdivision.
(b) If an agency finds that imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare requires adoption of a 
rule upon fewer than twenty (20) thirty (30) days' notice and states in writing its reasons for that finding, it may 
proceed without prior notice or hearing, or upon any abbreviated notice and hearing that it may choose, to adopt an 
emergency rule. The rule may be effective for no longer than one hundred twenty (120) days.
(c) Every agency shall accord any person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of 
any rule. Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition, the agency shall either deny the petition, stating in 
writing its reasons for the denial, or shall initiate rule-making proceedings.
(d) (1) Every agency, including those exempted under § 25-15-202, shall file with the Secretary of State, 
the Arkansas State Library, and the Bureau of Legislative Research a copy of each rule and regulation adopted by it 
and a statement of financial impact for the rule or regulation.
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(2) The Secretary of State shall keep a register o f the rules open to public inspection, and it shall 
be a permanent register.
(3) Each agency shall provide its regulations to the Bureau o f Legislative Research in an 
electronic format acceptable to the bureau. The bureau shall place the agency regulations in the General 
Assembly's internet web site.
(4) (A) The scope of the financial impact statement shall be determined by the agency, but shall 
include, at a minimum, the estimated cost of complying with the rule and the estimated cost for the agency to 
implement the rule.
(B) If the agency has reason to believe that the development of a financial impact 
statement will be so speculative as to be cost prohibitive, the agency shall submit a statement and explanation to 
that effect.
(C) If the purpose of a state agency rule or regulation is to implement a federal rule or 
regulation, the financial impact statement shall be limited to any incremental additional cost o f the state rule or 
regulation as opposed to the federal rule or regulation.
(e) Each rule adopted by an agency shall be effective ten (10) days after filing unless a later date is 
specified by law or in the rule itself. However, an emergency rule may become effective immediately upon filing, or 
at a stated time less than ten (10) days thereafter, if the agency finds that this effective date is necessary because of 
imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. The agency's finding and a brief statement o f the reasons 
therefor shall be filed with the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to 
the persons who may be affected by them.
(f)(1 ) No rule adopted after June 30, 1967, shall be valid unless adopted and filed in substantial 
compliance with this section.
(2) An action to contest the validity of a rule on the grounds o f noncompliance with any 
provision of this subchapter shall be commenced within two (2) years after the effective date of the rule.
(g ) [Repealed.]
(h) (g) In any proceeding brought which questions the existence of imminent peril to the public health, 
safety, or welfare, a written finding by the agency that adoption of any emergency rule was necessary to avoid the 
loss of federal funding or certification shall establish a prima facie case o f the existence o f imminent peril to the 
public health, safety, or welfare and the burden of proof shall shift to the challenger to rebut the existence of the 
condition by a preponderance of the evidence.
SECTI ON 4. Arkansas Code 25-15-205, concerning The Arkansas Register, is amended by adding an 
additional subsection to read as follows:
(e)(1) The Secretary of State shall publish the rules contained in "The Arkansas Register" on its internet
web site.
(2) The Secretary of State may omit from publication on its internet web site any rules:
(A) That are published on an agency, board, or commission internet web site and are 
accessible at no cost to the public: or
(B) In which publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise, so 
long as its internet web site indicates where and how a copy of the omitted materials may be obtained.
SECTION 5. Arkansas Code 25-15-212, concerning judicial review, is amended by adding an additional 
subsection to read as follows:
(i) Any agency order which is affirmed or affirmed in part by the court shall be a final judgment subject 
to writ of garnishment or execution to the extent it is affirmed.
SECTION 6. Arkansas Code 25-15-213 is amended to read as follows:
25-15-213. Hearings generally.
In every case of adjudication, and in cases of rule making in which rules are required by law to be made 
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, and in cases o f rule making in which, pursuant to § 25-15- 
204(a)(2), the agency shall direct that oral testimony be taken or a hearing held:
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(1) Any person compelled to appear before any agency or representative thereof shall have the right to be 
accompanied and advised by counsel. Every party shall have the right to appear in person or by counsel.
(2) (A) There shall preside at the hearing:
(i) The agency;
(ii) One (1) or more members of the agency; or
(iii) One (1) or more examiners or referees designated by the agency.
(B) All presiding officers and all officers participating in decisions shall conduct themselves in 
an impartial manner and may at any time withdraw if they deem themselves disqualified.
(C) Any party may file an affidavit of personal bias or disqualification, which affidavit shall be 
ruled on by the agency and granted if timely, sufficient, and filed in good faith.
(3) (A) Presiding officers shall have power, pursuant to published procedural rules of the agency:
(i) To issue subpoenas if the agency is authorized by law to issue them;
(ii) To administer oaths and affirmations;
(iii) To maintain order;
(iv) To rule upon all questions arising during the course of a hearing or proceeding;
(v) To permit discovery by deposition or otherwise;
(vi) To hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of issues;
(vii) To make or recommend decisions; and
(viii) Generally to regulate and guide the course of the pending proceeding.
(B) In any proceeding before any agency, if any person refuses to respond to a subpoena, or 
refuses to take the oath or affirmation as a witness or thereafter refuses to be examined, or refuses to obey any 
lawful order of an agency contained in its decision rendered after hearing, the agency or the presiding officer o f the 
agency hearing may apply to the circuit court of the county where the proceedings were held or are being held or to 
the circuit court of the county where a petition for judicial review was filed for an order directing that person to 
take the requisite action or to otherwise comply with the order o f the agency. The court shall issue the order in its 
discretion. Should any person willfully fail to comply with an order so issued, the court shall punish him as for 
contempt.
(4) Except as otherwise provided by law, the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof. 
Irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. Any other oral or documentary evidence, 
not privileged, may be received if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of 
their affairs. Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted of record. When a hearing will be 
expedited and the interests of the parties will not be substantially prejudiced, any part of the evidence may be 
received in written form.
(5) Parties shall have the right to conduct such cross examination as may be required for a full and true 
disclosure of the facts.
(6) Official notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts and of generally recognized technical or 
scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified of material so noticed, including 
any staff memoranda or data, and shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to show the contrary.
(7)(A) Every agency that has the authority to conduct a hearing which is subject to this section may issue 
subpoenas and bring before the agency as a witness any person in this state.
(B) The subpoena may require the witness to bring any book, writing, or other thing under the 
person's control which the person is required by law to produce in evidence.
(C) Service of the subpoena shall be in accordance with law or rule for the service o f subpoenas
in civil cases.
(D)(i) Arkansas Code 25-15-213(7) is intended to be supplemental and add the power to issue 
subpoenas to the various agencies which do not have the power to do so; and
(iii) This provision shall not repeal any law or part of laws now in existence.
SECTION 7. Arkansas Code 25-15-214 is amended to read as follows:
25-15-214. Failure of agency to act - Action by injured party.
In any case of rule making or adjudication, if an agency shall unlawfully, unreasonably, or capriciously
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fail, refuse, or delay to act, any person who considers himself injured in his person, business, or property by the 
failure, refusal, or delay may bring suit in the chancery circuit court of any county in which he resides or does 
business, or in the Chancery Circuit Court of Pulaski County, for an order commanding the agency to act.
SECTION 8. Arkansas Code Title 25, Chapter 15, Subchapter 2 is amended by adding additional sections 
to read as follows:
25-15-215. Model Rules.
(a) (1) The Attorney General shall publish model rules of procedure for use by agencies.
(2) The model rules shall include general functions and duties commonly performed by agencies.
(b) (1) Each agency created after the effective date of this act shall adopt, in accordance with the 
provisions of this subchapter, those model rules that are practicable.
(2) Any agency that adopts a rule of procedure that differs from the model rule shall, in 
conjunction with adopting the rule of procedure, state the reason why the relevant portions of the model rules are 
impracticable.
25-15-216. Review of Agency Rules.
(a) As soon as is practicable after each regular session of the General Assembly, each agency shall review 
any newly enacted laws to determine whether:
(1) Any existing rule should be repealed or amended: or
(2) Any new rule should be adopted.
(b) At the conclusion of each review, the agency shall adopt a written report of the result o f the review.
(c) A copy of each report shall be maintained as a public record by the agency.
25-15-217. Alternative Sanctions.
(a) (1) Each agency which may suspend, revoke, or deny a license for acts or omissions, or other conduct 
as provided bv law may impose alternative sanctions set forth in subsection (b) of this section.
(2) The penalties set forth in subsection (b) of this section shall be supplemental to anv agency’s 
authority to impose penalties upon any person or entity under the board or commission’s jurisdiction.
(b) Each agency may impose on anv person or entity under the agency’s 
jurisdiction:
( 1) A monetary penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation:
(2) A requirement that the person complete appropriate education programs, courses, or both:
(3) A requirement that the person or entity successfully complete:
(A) A licensing examination:
(B) A credentialing examination: or
(C) Anv other examination required in order to obtain a permit, license, registration, or
credential:
(4) Conditions or restrictions upon regulated activities of the holder of a license, permit, 
certificate, credential, registration, or other authority: and
(5) Other requirements or penalties as may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case 
and which would achieve the agency's desired disciplinary purposes, but which would not impair the public health 
and welfare.
(c) The agency may file suit to collect anv monetary penalty assessed pursuant to this subchapter if the 
penalty is not paid within the time prescribed bv the agency, in either the Circuit Court of Pulaski County or the 
circuit court of anv county in which the person or entity under the agency's jurisdiction:
(1) Resides: or
(2) Does business.
(d) Upon imposition of a sanction against a person or entity under the agency's jurisdiction, the agency 
may order that the license, permit, certification, credential, or registration be suspended until the person or entity 
has complied in full with all applicable sanction imposed pursuant to this section.
(e)(1) Each violation shall constitute a separate violation.
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(2) The power and authority of the agency to impose a sanction authorized in this section shall 
not be affected by any other civil or criminal proceeding concerning the same violation.
House Bill 1496 allows owners o f forfeited severed mineral interests to redeem those
interests without paying $25.00 to the Commissioner o f State Lands as is required by current law.
It would be better to raise the $25.00 fee, make it apply to all redemptions, and leave the
severance tax alone. Here is the text o f House Bill 1496:
State of Arkansas 
83rd General Assembly 
Regular Session, 2001
By: Representative D. Elliott
A Bill
HOUSE BILL 1496
For An Act To Be Entitled
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE 21-6-203 TO CLARIFY THE 
TWENTY-FIVE DOLLAR FEE COLLECTED BY THE COMMISSIONER 
OF STATE LANDS, AND TO EXEMPT FROM SAID FEE THE 
REDEMPTION COSTS OF SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS; AND FOR 
OTHER PURPOSES.
Subtitle
TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE 21-6-203 TO 
CLARIFY THE TWENTY-FIVE DOLLAR FEE 
COLLECTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF STATE 
LANDS, AND TO EXEMPT FROM SAID FEE THE 
REDEMPTION COSTS OF SEVERED MINERAL 
INTERESTS.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code 21-6-203 is amended to read as follows:
21-6-203. Commissioner of State Lands.
(a) The following fees shall be charged and collected by the Commissioner of State Lands:
(1) Emerged Land Deeds issued pursuant to §§ 22-5-404, 22-5-405 ................................$ 5.00
(2) Deeds to 16th section school lands under § 22-5-407 ..................................................... 5.00
(3) Quitclaim deed of mineral interest under § 22-6-502 ..................................................... 5.00
(4) Issuance of duplicate deeds and patents under § 22-6-104 ............................................  5.00
(5) Issuance of original patents under § 22-6-105 .................................................................  5.00
(6) Redemption deeds issued under § 26-37-310 .................................................................  5.00
(7) Issuance of sale deeds .............................................................. ........................................ 5.00
(8) Double entry statements....................................................................................................  3.00
(9) Disclaimers .......................................................................................................................  3.00
(10) For each page of field notes issued by the Office of the State Land Commissioner . . .  .50
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(11) A fee of five dollars ($5.00) plus actual cost for each Government Land Office plat copied 
and distributed.
(b) The Commissioner shall charge a twenty-five dollar (S25.00) collection fee against all tax delinquent 
land which has been transferred to the Commissioner of State Lands redeemed or sold bv the Commissioner of 
State Lands except the fees charged for the redemption of severed mineral interests shall not include the twenty- 
five dollar ($25.00 ) collection fee.
(c) For each certificate of donation to forfeited lands issued by the Commissioner of State Lands, there 
shall be paid into the State Treasury the sum a fee of ten dollars ($10.00).
(d) For each donation deed issued by the Commissioner of State Lands, there shall be paid into the State 
Treasury the sum a fee of one dollar ($1.00).
(e) All fees and charges collected by the Commissioner of State Lands shall be deposited in the State 
Treasury to-the credit o f the Constitutional Officers Fund a financial institution in the state.
SECTION 2. EMERGENCY CLAUSE. It is hereby found and determined bv the Eighty-third General 
Assembly that the effective date of this act shall be July 1, 2001, in that the fiscal year for all state agencies begins 
on July 1 ; that for purposes of accounting and record keeping it is necessary that the changes made by this act to 
the collection of fees by the Commissioner of State Lands be implemented on a date corresponding with the start of 
the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the 
preservation o f the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2001.
Arkansas Royalty Membership (“ARM”) and a few prominent oil and gas producers have 
authored proposed legislation to modernize the Arkansas Statutes dealing with payment o f  
royalties. This proposed bill has not yet been introduced, since much o f the natural gas industry is 
reluctant to expend any energy doing anything other than opposing the severance tax increase. 
However, it is still possible that the bill will be introduced in the current legislative session and, if  
not, look for it in 2003.
The text o f  the current draft is as follows:
15-74-703. Entitlement of royalty interests to premiums and bonuses.
All purchasers of oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons and gas shall pay to the royalty interest the same 
premium or bonus above the posted market price for oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons or gas they pay to the 
leaseholder or working interest under any oil, gas, or mineral lease on lands from which oil and/or other liquid 
hydrocarbons or g as  may be purchased under contract with the lease owner or operator.
15-74-704. Paying part of production cost or giving bonus or premium without paying share to royalty 
interest.
It shall be unlawful for any purchaser of oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons or gas to enter into any 
contract with any lessee or operator under any oil, gas, or mineral lease, whereby the purchaser undertakes to pay 
any of the cost or expense of operation or production, steaming, treating, or running oil and/or other liquid 
hydrocarbons or gas or any other bonus or premium under any name or subterfuge whatsoever, without providing 
for paying to the royalty interest its proportionate share according to interest therein.
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15-74-705. Purchaser’s price for royalty gas-paid on oil that is produced and sold.
It shall be the duty o f both the lessee, or his assignee, and any pipeline company, corporation, or 
individual contracting for the purchase of oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons or gas that is produced and sold 
under any oil, gas, or mineral lease to protect the royalty of the lessor’s interest by paying to the lessor or his 
assignees the same price, including premiums, steaming charges, and bonuses of whatsoever name for royalty oil 
and other liquid hydrocarbons or gas that is produced and sold, that is paid the operator or lessee under the lease for 
the working interest thereunder.
15-74-706. Contracting to buy royalty gas oil for less than price paid operator or lessee.
It shall be unlawful for any pipeline company, corporation, or individual purchasing oil and/or other liquid 
hydrocarbons or gas from the operator or lessee of any oil, gas or mineral lease to enter into any contract with the 
operator or lessee whereby the purchaser acquires the royalty oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons or gas reserved in 
the oil, gas or mineral lease for any price less than the price paid the operator or lessee of the lease.
14- 73-707. Time of royalty payment -  Monthly statements to royalty owners.
(a) It shall be the duty o f any purchaser of oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons or gas to  pay the royalty 
interest at the same time it pays the lessee or producer. However, the parties may expressly waive the 
time and manner of payment in writing.
(b) The purchaser shall at some time not later than the twelfth last day of each month furnish each royalty 
owner with a statement showing the correct amount of oil or gas and/or other liquid hydrocarbons 
purchased during the previous month together with the correct amount paid each in interest therefore.
15-74-708. Forfeiture Payment of lease- treble damages upon lessee receiving more than share from sale -  
Purchaser to pay treble value.
(a) Notwithstanding any terms or conditions contained in any oil, gas and mineral lease. a Any leaseholder or 
operator who contracts for the sale of gas or oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons to any pipeline company or 
other purchaser, under and by virtue of the terms of which the lessee receives a greater amount than the royalty 
owners in proportion to interest therein, or receives a bonus, or by any other means conspires with a purchaser 
to receive from the sale o f such oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons and/or gas more than his just 
proportionate share therefrom shall forfeit his r ights in and to the leasehold premises pay to the royalty owners 
treble the value o f the amount of oil wrongfully withheld from the royalty interest.
(b) Any pipeline company or other purchaser of oil and/or other liquid hydrocarbons who makes royalty 
payments directly to the royalty owners and and gas who contracts with any lessee as set out in subsection (a) 
of this section to the injury of the royalty owners shall forfeit be jointly and severally liable with such lessee to 
the royalty- owners. owners treble value of  the amount-of  oil or  gas runs thus wrongfully taken withheld from 
the royalty interest.
SUBCHAPTER 8 
NATURAL GAS ROYALTY ACT
15-74-800. Definitions.
(a) “Gas” as used in this section shall mean natural gas that is not produced and sold with any liquid 
hydrocarbons.
(b) “Wellhead” as used in this section shall mean the location of the well from which gas is produced.
(c) “Minimum Quality Gas” as used in this section shall mean gas for which a market exists at the 
wellhead, or if no such market exists at the wellhead, gas which satisfies each of the following criteria:
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(i) Pressure of 50 pounds per square inch at sixty degrees Fahrenheit;
(ii) Presence of not more than 1/4 grain of hydrogen sulphide nor more than 10 grains of
total sulphur per 100 cubic feet;
(iii) Presence of not more than seven pounds of water per million cubic feet: and
(iv) Average BTU content of not less than 950 BTU per cubic feet.
(d) “Market Value” as used in this section shall mean the actual value proceeds of sales of gas, 
untreated and uncompressed, at the wellhead from which it is produced, unless if such gas is sold untreated and 
uncompressed at the wellhead: or if such gas is not marketable at the wellhead because it, in any respect, fails to 
satisfy the criteria of Minimum Quality Gas,  in which case “market value” shall mean the value of such gas at the 
wellhead, after treatment or compression sufficient to cause it to satisfy such criteria.
(e) “Reasonable and prudent operator” as used in this section shall mean an oil and gas operator 
engaged to obtain profits for the lessor and the lessee who bases its development of the leasehold upon the 
following considerations:
( i) The quantity of oil and/or gas capable of being produced from the premises as indicated 
by prior exploration and development:
(ii) The local market or demand;
(iii) Means of transporting to market:
(iv ) Extent and result of operations, if any, on adjacent lands:
(v) Character of the reservoir: and
(vi) Custom and usage within the natural gas industry.
15-74-801. Payment of royalties on gas production.
(a) Whenever an oil and gas lease requires the lessee to pay royalties on gas production based upon the 
market value of such gas produced such market value shall have the meaning set out in this section and royalties 
shall be payable based upon the lease terms, and upon the proportionate share of all payments received for all gas 
sold, and delivered by the lessee that was produced on the lease premises or lands pooled therewith.
(b) Whenever an oil and gas lease requires the lessee to pay royalties on gas production based upon the 
proceeds from the sale o f gas from the lease, and such sale occurs at the wellhead before any treatment, separation, 
gathering, transportation, or compression other than that required to cause the gas to become Minimum Quality 
Gas, such proceeds shall mean the actual proceeds received by the lessee for such gas sold and delivered, whether 
or not the lessee is required to cause the gas to become Minimum Quality Gas.
(c) Whenever an oil and gas lease requires the lessee to pay royalties on gas production 
based upon the proceeds from the sale of gas from the lease, and:
(i) such sale occurs at a point away from the wellhead; and/or
(ii) the lessee, acting as a reasonable and prudent operator, enhances the value of such gas 
by supplying treatment, dehydration, separation, gathering, transportation, and/or 
compression in excess of that required to cause the gas to become Minimum Quality 
Gas, then
such proceeds shall mean the actual proceeds received by the lessee for such gas sold and delivered reduced by the 
lessee’s actual direct expenses, if reasonably incurred, to supply such treatment, dehydration, separation, gathering, 
transportation and/or compression in excess of that required to cause the gas to satisfy the criteria of Minimum 
Quality Gas and/or the lessee’s actual direct expenses, if reasonably incurred, to gather, compress, and/or transport 
such gas to a point of sale away from the wellhead.
(c) In no event shall a lessee be required to pay royalties on any payments made to lessee 
other than payments made for gas produced and sold.
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(d) The terms of this section shall not be applicable to any producing unit or well that 
produces liquid hydrocarbons only, or gas containing hydrogen sulfide in excess of 30 parts per 
million.
14-73-801.1. Time of royalty payment.
Payment of gas royalties shall be paid as set forth in Section 15-72-305.
15-74-803. Payment of treble damages upon lessee receiving more than share from sale - Purchaser to pay 
treble value.
(a )  Notwithstanding any terms or conditions contained in any oil, gas and mineral lease, any leaseholder 
or operator who contracts for the sale of gas to any pipeline company or other purchaser, under and by virtue of the 
terms of which the lessee receives a greater amount than the royalty owners in proportion to interest therein, or 
receives a bonus, or by any other means conspires with a purchaser to receive from the sale of such gas more than 
his just proportionate share therefrom shall pay to the royalty owners treble the value of the amount of gas 
wrongfully withheld from the royalty interest.
(b-) Anv pipeline company or other-purchaser of -gas who contracts with anv lessee as set out in -subsection 
(a) of  this section -to the injury of the royalty  owners shall forfeit to the royalty owners treble-value of the amount of  
gas thus-wrongfully withheld from-the royalty interest.
In recent litigation, parties challenging the validity of an Arkansas Oil and Gas 
Commission integration order attempted to disqualify Commission Counsel William Wynne based 
upon the language of current Arkansas Code Annotated § 15-71-104, which appears to state that 
only the Attorney General (or, in emergencies, the prosecuting attorney) has a right to represent 
the Commission. In response, the Commission intends to introduce a bill re-writing A.C.A. §15- 
71-104. The current text of that bill, which has not yet been introduced, is as follows:
15-71-104. Counsel for the Commission.
(a) The Commission may employ an attorney to provide specialized professional services in matters 
requiring legal representation; provided that any contract therefor shall be subject to approval by the Attorney 
General who shall otherwise be attorney for the Commission. However, in cases of emergencies the Commission 
may call upon the prosecuting attorney of the district where the action is to be brought or defended to represent the 
Commission until such time as contract counsel or the Attorney General may take charge of the litigation.
(b) Any member of the Commission or the secretary thereof shall have power to administer oaths to any 
witness to any hearing, investigation, or proceeding contemplated by this act or by any other law of this state 
relating to the conservation of oil or gas.
In addition to the above-statutory revision, the Oil and Gas Commission is trying to figure 
a way to increase the conservation assessments which are the Commission’s primary sources of 
income. Specific legislation has not yet been drafted. Moreover, the severance tax bill presents a
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major obstacle because if it passes in anything resembling its current form, the industry will be 
tapped out and thus unwilling to support an increase in the conservation assessment.
As noted above, the legislative session is a piece of work in progress. The deadline for 
submitting this paper for publication is February 13, 2001. This paper will be delivered February 
24. Much can (and probably will) change in those eleven days. Stay tuned.
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